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OpenPulse

Identity

Sign-in your organization controls.

Your people sign in with passkeys or through the provider you already run. You set the rules, see every session and keep an audit log you can verify yourself. Agents sign in as identities with their own keys.

Live · by request · runs in Helsinki

A sign-in passes four checks before a session exists.

A person types their work address. From there the path is the same every time, and every station on it writes an entry to your audit log.

  1. 01

    Address

    lena@sorvenna.example

    The domain is verified, so OpenPulse knows which organization answers for it.

  2. 02

    Your provider

    Okta · Entra ID · Google

    She signs in where she always does. Her password never reaches OpenPulse.

  3. 03

    Signed answer

    OIDC or SAML 2.0

    OpenPulse checks the signature, who the answer was issued for and how old it is.

  4. 04

    Policy

    Method · factor · device

    Your rules decide whether this is enough, or a second factor or a registered device is needed.

  5. 05

    Session

    Bound to the device key

    The session lives on this device. A copied token does not work anywhere else.

Run by OpenPulseRun by you: your own provider

Without single sign-on the path is shorter: a passkey on the device takes the place of the provider and its signed answer.

Passkeys first, and no SMS.

A passkey is created on the device and its private key never leaves it, so there is no password to steal or reuse. An email link is the fallback, and you can refuse it for your own addresses.

Passkeys
The first way in on every device. Adding or removing one asks for a fresh confirmation.
Second factor
Authenticator codes, recovery codes, a passkey confirmation, or an approval in the OpenPulse app where you match a number.
Assurance levels
Every sign-in records how it was done. A passkey that syncs between devices never counts as the highest level.

Your directory decides who exists.

Connect the identity provider you already run, one per organization. People are created, grouped and removed there, and OpenPulse follows.

Single sign-on
OpenID Connect or SAML 2.0, with setup steps for Okta, Entra ID and Google Workspace.
SCIM 2.0
Your provider creates people, puts them in groups and deactivates them. A deactivated person is signed out at once.
Verified domains
Prove an email domain with a DNS record. A domain belongs to one organization, and the provider speaks only for verified domains.
Require single sign-on
An email link for a company address is refused and the person is sent to your provider.

You decide what counts as a sign-in.

Set the rules once for everyone, or group by group.

Allowed methods
Choose which ways in your people may use, and require a passkey where it matters.
Second factor by group
Set the level a group needs, with a grace period for people who still have to enroll.
Registered devices
Require a device the organization knows, with its key held in the device’s secure hardware.
Sign-in lifetime
Decide how long a sign-in lasts before a person confirms again.

Every session is listed, and any of them can be ended.

A person sees their own sessions and devices, and an admin sees the organization’s. Tokens are bound to the device’s key, so a copied token does not work elsewhere.

Sign out one or all
End a single session or every other one, from the account page or the Console.
Rotating tokens
A refresh token changes on every use. Reusing an old one ends that sign-in and shows in the security activity.

Two people for the steps that matter, and a log you can check yourself.

A sensitive admin action can wait until a second admin approves with their own passkey. Every change and sign-in goes into your organization’s audit log, where each entry carries the hash of the one before it.

Two-person approvals
Nobody can approve their own request, and an approval lasts a limited time.
Verify
Run the check from the Console. An intact chain names its newest entry and that entry’s hash, which you keep to show later that nothing before it changed.
Export
Take the log into your own systems whenever you want.
  1. Single sign-on required

    by an admin, approved by a second

    before
    9f2c…41ab
    hash
    c07e…d913
  2. Passkey added

    by the person, on a new laptop

    before
    c07e…d913
    hash
    5a81…7fe0
  3. Person deactivated

    by your provider, over SCIM

    before
    5a81…7fe0
    hash
    e3b4…02c6
Each entry starts from the hash the last one ended on. Change or remove one, and every hash after it stops matching. The newest hash is the one you write down.

Agents are identities with their own keys.

An agent gets a DID, a @handle in your realm and its own Ed25519 key. It signs a fresh challenge to sign in, so there is no shared API key to leak. You suspend it, rotate its keys or remove it from the Console, and every sign-in is logged.

Sorvenna Logistik GmbH puts its people behind Entra ID.

Sorvenna is a made-up freight company that already runs Entra ID. This is the order of the work, and the last row is the day someone leaves.

  1. 01

    Verify the domain

    IT publishes one DNS record for sorvenna.example. The domain now belongs to Sorvenna’s organization and to no other.

  2. 02

    Connect Entra ID

    An admin enters the SAML details from Entra in the Console and signs in through it once herself.

  3. 03

    Turn on SCIM

    Entra creates the people and their groups. Dispatch and Finance arrive as groups a policy can name.

  4. 04

    Require single sign-on

    An email link for a sorvenna.example address is now refused, and the policy for Finance asks for a passkey as well.

  5. 05

    A dispatcher leaves

    IT deactivates her in Entra. SCIM passes it on, her sign-ins end and her live connections are cut within seconds.

What a security lead asks next.

What does “Require single sign-on” cover today?
It refuses an email link for any address on your verified domains and sends the person to your provider. A passkey that already exists, or a device that is already signed in, still works until its session ends.
Which providers has it been tested with?
Single sign-on and SCIM are tested against stand-ins shaped like Okta and Entra ID, and the Console has setup steps for Okta, Entra ID and Google Workspace. We make the first connection to your provider together with you.
How does offboarding work?
In one step: deactivate the person in your provider. They are signed out of OpenPulse at once, and with Private access their devices and grants leave your network too.

Where it stands today.

  • Single sign-on accepts signed responses from your provider. Signed requests, encrypted assertions and single logout are not supported yet.
  • Sign-in runs on one node in Helsinki today.
  • The approval in the OpenPulse app needs the app, which comes with your organization’s access.
  • Our sign-in service has not been independently audited.

How security and privacy work

Put your organization on one identity.

Tell us how your people sign in today. We set up your organization, your domain and your provider with you.